A primary motivation for reasoning under uncertainty is to derive decisions in the face of inconclusive evi dence. However, Shafer's theory of belief functions, which explicitly represents the underconstrained na ture of many reasoning problems, lacks a formal pro cedure for making decisions. Clearly, when sufficient information is not available, no theory can prescribe actions without making additional assumptions. Faced with this situation, some assumption must be made if a clearly superior choice is to emerge. In this paper we offer a probabilistic interpretation of a simple assump tion that disambiguates decision problems represented with belief functions. We prove that it yields expected values identical to those obtained by a probabilistic analysis that makes the same ass umption. In addi tion, we show how the decision analysis methodology frequently employed in probabilistic reasoning can be extended for use with belief functions.
Introduction
Shafer's mathematical theory of evidence (10, 9] (also known as belief functions) has been proposed as the basis for representing and deriving beliefs in computer programs that reason with uncertain information. The ability of the theory to represent degrees of uncertainty as well as degrees of imprecision allows an expert sys tem to represent beliefs more accurately than it could using only a probability distribution. Despite these virtues, the theory of belief functions has lacked a for mal basis upon which decisions can be made in the face of imprecision [1] . In contrast, a sizable subfield known 1 Thls research was partially supported by the Defense Ad vanced Research Projects Agency under Contract No. N000 39-88-C-0248 in conjunction with the U.S. Navy Space and Na.va.l Warfare Systems Command.
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as decision theory provides a formal basis for decision making when the underlying representation of uncer tainty is ordinary probability [2] . Shafer's "Construc tive Decision Theory" addresses the need for judgment at every level of a decision problem, but does not attempt to generalize decision theory for belief func tions [11] . More recently, Lesh has proposed a method ology based on an empirically derived coefficient of ig norance whereby clear-cut decisions result [6] .
In the present paper we use a theoretically moti vated probabilistic assumption to decide among ac tions when evidence is represented by belief functions.
This approach leads to a generalization of decision analysis that is derived from the dose relationship be tween belief functions and probability. The approach offers the foundation for a decision theory for belief functions and provides a formal basis upon which sys tems that employ belief functions can make decisions.
Expected Value
Decision analysis provides a methodological approach for making decisions. The crux of the method is that one should choose the action that will maximize the expected value. In this section we review the compu tation of expected value using a probabilistic represen tation of a simple example and show how a belief func tion gives rise to a range of expected values. We then show how a simple assumption about the benevolence of nature leads to a means for choosing a single-point expected value for belief functions. shown. For a $6.00 fee, the player gets to spin the wheel and receives the amount shown in the sector that stops at the top. Should we be willing to play?
Expected value using probabilities
The analysis of this problem lends itself readily to a probabilistic representation. From inspection of the wheel (assuming each sector really is equally likely), we can construct the following probability distribution:
The expected value E(8), where 8 is the set of possi ble outcomes, is computed from the formula 
5.90
Therefore, we should refuse to play, because the ex pected value of playing the game is less than the $6.00
cost of playing2. Let us now modify the problem slightly in order to motivate a belief function approach to the problem.
2Here we assume that the monetary value is directly propor tional to utility because of the small dollar amounts involved. However, one of the sectors is hidden from view.
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How much are we willing to pay to play this game?
This problem is ideally suited to an analysis using belief functions. In a belief function representation a unit of belief is distributed over the space of possi ble outcomes (commonly called the frame of discern ment). Unlike a probability distribution, which dis tributes belief over elements of the outcome space, this distribution (called a mass function) attributes belief to subsets of the outcome space. Belief attributed to a subset signifies that there is reason to believe that the outcome will be among the elements of that subset, without committing to any preference among those el ements. Formally, a mass distribution me is a map ping from subsets of a frame of discernment e into the unit interval: such that me(¢)::::;: 0 and L me(A) = 1.
A�e
We could instead have chosen to work in a frame of utilities to account for nonlinearities in one's preferences for money. We'll have more to say about utility in the discussion· that follows this section.
Any subset that has been attributed nonzero mass is called a focal element. One of the ramifications of this representation is that the belief in a hypothesis A (A � 6) is constrained to lie within an interval [Spt(A), Pls(A)], where Spt(A) = L me(Ai) Pls(A):::: 1-Spt(-,A).
(2)
These bounds are commonly referred to as support and plausibility.
The frame of discernment 0 for Wheel #2 is {$1,$5,$10,$20}. The mass function for Wheel #2 is shown below:
and its ass ociated belief intervals are
Before we can compute the expected value of this belief function we must somehow ass ess the value of the hidden sector. We know that there is a 0.1 chance that the hidden sector will be selected, but what value should we attribute to that sector? If the carnival hawker were allowed to assign a dollar value to that sector, he would surely have assigned $1. On the other hand if we (or a cooperative friend) were allowed to do so, it would have been $20. Any other assignment method would result in a value between $1 and $20, inclusive. Therefore , if we truly do not know what assignment method was used, the strongest statement that we can make is that the value of the hidden sector is between $1 and $20. Using interval arithmetic we can apply the expected value formula of Equation 1 to obtain an expected value interval (EVI):
3We use inf(A) or sup(A) to denote the smallest or largest element in the set A C e. 9 is assumed to be a set of scalar values [13] .
- An alternative assumption is that the best estimate of the probability distribution for the value of the hidden sector is the same as the known distribution of the visible sectors. Using this ass umption, the result is $6.00: a p(a) a· p ( a) 1 4/9 4/9 5 2/9 10/9 10 2/9 20/9 20 1/9 20/9 E(0) = 6.00
Rather than making one of these assumptions, we may wish to parameterize by an unknown probability pour belief that either we get to choose the value of the hidden sec tor or the carnival hawker does:
Definition:
Let p = the probabiliiy that the valne assigned to the hidden sector is the one that we would have assigned, if given the opportunity.
( 1-p) = the probability that the carnival hawker chose the value of the hidden sector.
Using this probability we can recompute the ex pected value of the hidden sector:
The expected value of Wheel #2 can then be recom puted using probabilities and Equation 1 as illustrated here:
To decide whether to play the game, we need only assess the probability p. For the carnival wheel it would be wise to allow that the hawker has hidden the value from our-view, thus we might assume that p = 0. So E(8) = 5.50 and we should not be willing to spin the wheel for more than $5.50. This wheel has 5 sectors hidden from view. How ever, we do know that none of these sectors is a $20, that the first hidden sector is either a $5 or a. $10, and that the second hidden sector is either a. $1 or a. $10. How much a.re we willing to pay to spin Wheel #3?
A probabilistic analysis of Wheel #3 requires one to make additional ass u mptions. Estimating the condi tional probability distribution for each hidden sector would provide enough information to compute the ex pected value of the wheel. Alternatively, estimating just the expected value of each hidden sector would suffice as well. However, this can be both tedious and frustrating: tedious because there may be many hid den sectors, and frustrating because we're being asked to provide information that, in actuality, we do not have. ( If we knew the conditional probabilities or the expected values, we would have used them in our orig inal analysis.) What is the minimum information nec essary to establish a single expected value for Wheel #3? Given a mass function m e defined over a scalar frame e, and an estimate of p, the probability that all residual ignorance will turn out favorably, the expected value of m e is Proof:
Consider a mass function me defi ned over a frame of discernment 8. Now consider any focal element A� 8, such that m e ( A ) > 0. Since p = the probabil ity that a cooperative agent will control which a E A will be selected and (1-p ) =the probability that an adversary will be in control, then the probability that a will be chosen is
Considering all focal elements in m e , we can construct a probability distribution pe(a) using Bayes' rule:
The double summations can be collapsed to a sin gle summation because ever y A � 0 has a unique sup(A) E 0 and a unique inf(A ) E 0.
The important point here is th::�-t the Bayesian anal ysis provides a meaningful way to choose a distin guished point within an EVL That distinguished point can then be used as the basis of comparison of several choices when their respective EVI's overlap.
Discussion
The value of the result of an action is frequently mea sured in money (e.g., in dollars), but people often ex hibit preferences that are not consistent with maxi mization of expected monetary value. The theory of utility accounts for this behavior by associating for an individual decision-maker a value (measured in utiles) with each state s, u = f(s), such that maximization of expected utility yields ch oices consistent with that individual's behavior [3] . Utility theory can satisfacto rily account for a person's willingness to expose himself to risk and should be used whenever one's preferences are not linearly related to value. In this paper we do not distin guish between value and utility-the results apply to either metric.
Because of its interval representation of belief, Shafer's theory poses difficulties for a decision-maker who uses it. While a clear choice can always be made when the intervals do not overlap, Lesh [6] has pro posed a different method for choosing a distinguished point to use in· the ordering of overlapping choices.
Lesh makes use of an empirically-derived "ignorance preference coefficient," r, that is used to compute the distinguished point called "expected evidential be lief (EEB)":
A choice is made by choosing the action that maxi mizes the "expected evidential v::�-lue (EEV)" There may be circumstances in which a single pa rameter is insufficient to capture the underlying struc ture of a decision problem. In these cases it would be more app ropriate to use a different probability to represent the attitude of nature for each source of igno rance. Let Pi be the probability that ignorance within A; will be decided favorably, VA;, A; � 0. • list the viable options available for gathering in formation, for experimentation, and for action;
• list the events that may possibly occur;
• arrange the information you may acquire and the choices you may make in chronological order;
• decide the value to you of the consequences that result from the various courses of action open to
you; and
• judge what the chances are that any particular uncertain event will occur.
Decision analysis using probabili ties
First we will illustrate decision analysis on a problem that can be represented with probabilities to acquaint the reader with the method and terminology.
Example -Oil Drilling #1 A wildcatter must decide whether or not to drill for oil. He is uncertain whether the hole will be dry, have a trickle of oil, or be a gusher. Drilling a hole costs $70,000. The payoff for hitting a gusher, a trickle, or a dry hole are $270,000, $120,000, and $0, respectively. At a cost of $10,000 the wild catter could take seismic soundings that will help determine the underlying geologic structure. The soundings will determine whether the terrain has no structure, open structure, or closed structure.
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The experts have provided us with the joint prob abilities shown below. We are to determine the optimal sfmfegy for experimentation and action. In decision analysis a decision tree is constructed that captures the clJTon�logical order of actions and events [5] . A square is used to represent a decision to be made and its branches are labeled with the alterna tive choices. A circle is used to re p resen t a chance node and its branches are labeled with the conditional prob ability of each event given that the choices and events al ong the path leading to the node have occurred.
To compute the best strategy, the tree is evaluated from its leaves toward its root.
• The value of a leaf node is the value (or utility)
of the state of nature it re p resents.
• The value of a chance node is the expected value of the probability distribution represented by its branches as computed using Equation 1.
• The value of a choice node is the maximum of the values of each of its sons. The best choice for the node is denoted by the branch leading to the son with the greatest value. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
This procedure is repeated until the root node has been evaluated. The value of the root node is the ex pected value of the decision problem; the branches cor responding to the maximal value at each choice node gives the best strategy to follow (i.e. choices to make in each situation).
The evaluated decision tree for the Oil Drilling ex ample is portrayed in Figure 3 . It can be seen that the expected value is $22,500 and the best strategy is to take seismic soundings, to drill for oil if the soundings indicate open or closed structure, and not to drill if the soundings indicate no structure.
Decision analysis using belief func tions
To use the decision procedure just described, it must be possible to assess the probabilities of all uncertain events. That is, the set of branches emanating from each chance node in the decision tree must represent a probability distribution. In many scenarios, however, estimating these probability distributions is difficult or Several issues arise that prevent one from construct ing a well-formed decision tree for this example. First, consider the branch of the tree in which the test is 357 conducted and the result is green. If we drill for oil, then we know we will find either a trickle or a gusher, but we cannot determine the probability of either from the given information. We are tempted to label the branch with the disjunction, (Trickle V Gusher), with probability 1.0. But, what should be the payoff of that branch? All we can say is that the payoff will be ei ther $40,000 (if a trickle) or $190,000 (if a gusher) .
Ordinary decision analysis requires a. unique value to be assigned, but we have no basis for computing one.
So the first modification we make to the construction of decision trees is to allow disjunctions of events on branches emanating from chance nodes, and to allow intervals as the payoffs for leaf nodes. We will discuss later how to evaluate such a tree.
To see the second issue, consider the branch of the tree in which the test is not conducted. If we drill for oil, there is a chance that we will hit a gusher, a trickle, or a. dry well, but what is the probability distribution?
We know only that p(Dry I Red) = 1.0 p(Dry V Trickle I Yellow) = 1.0 p(Trickle V Gusher I Green}= 1.0
There is not enough information to use Bayes' rule to compute the probability distribution for the well capacity. Without adding a new assumption at this The second modifi cation we make to decision trees is to allow the branches emanating from a chance node to represent a mass function. The masses must still 358 sum to one, but the events need not be disjoint:4 The completed decision tree for Oil Drilling Example #2 is shown in Figure 4 .
The tools of Section 2 can be used to evaluate a decision tree modified in this manner.
• The value of a leaf node is the value of the state of nature it represents. This may be a unique value or, in the case of a disjunction of states, an interval of values.
• A chance node represents a belief function. Its value is the expected value interval computed with Equation 3
E(8) = [E.(8), E•(e)]
• A decision node represents a choice of the several branches emanating from it. The value of each 4 Recall that a probability distribution is an assignment of belief over mutually exclusive elements of a set, whereas a mass function is a distribution over possibly overlapping subsets.
branch may be a point value or an interval. The expected value of an interval is computed using Equation 5 and an estimate of p E( 8) ::::
The action on the branch that yiel ds the greatest E(8) is chosen. Ties are broken arbitrarily. Figure 4 shows the evaluated decision tree for In summary, a decision tree and decision analysis procedure for belief functions have been described .
Two modifications were made to adapt ordinary de cision trees: intervals are allowed where values occur;
and belief functions are allowed where probability dis tributions occur. A unique strategy5 can be obtained by estimating the probability p. One ramification of this decision procedure is that whenever one EVI is slightly "higher" than another,
Comparing two choices
i.e.
Et.(0) > E2. (8) and Er(e) > Ei(8} then it is always preferred. This is because the same value of p is ass umed to govern the outcome of both choices. Whether this is realistic depends on the situ ation and deserves further study.
Discussion
It is interesting to compare the types of assumptions made in a probabilistic analysis with the p ass ump tion proposed here for belief functions. When using probability, a maximum entropy ass umption is often made. Sometimes, this assumption is justified , and it should properly be considered part of the evidence, not as an assumption. When this is the case, a max imum en tropy belief function can be used as well. At other times, the maximum entropy ass umption is not justified, but is used simply because some ass umption must be made, and maximum entropy has some de sirable properties [12] . In these cases, the choice of elements in the sample space (the set of poss ibilities )
introduces distortion into the expected value that will result. That is, adding a few more poss ibilities into the sample space will change the expected value of the maximum entropy distribution over that sample space.
(For example, if we chose to allow for the poss ibil ity of $2 being among the poss ibilities for the hidden sector of a carnival wheel the sample space would be 
Summary
We have described a decision theory for Shafe r's the ory of belief fu nctions. We started by defining the notion of expected value interval (EVI) and showed it to properly bound the expected value of any prob ability distribution that could be obtained by intrcr clueing additional assumptions. Because an expected value interval is often insufficient for decision-making, we recognize that a point must be chosen to compare alternative choices. We then showed how a linear in terpolation of a distinguished value within the EVI is equivalent to making an assumption of the benevolence or maleficence of nature. Letting p be the probability that imprecision will be resolved favorably, we derived that distinguished point.
We have also shown how the theory can be used to generalize the decision trees used in probabilistic de cision analysis. These tools allow a decision-maker to defer unwarranted assumptions until the latest possi ble moment. In so doing he can sometimes avoi d mak ing any assumptions at all. Otherwise, he is fo rced to provide only enough additional information to allow a clear choice, and has the benefit of all avai lable in formation to selectively decide where he would like to make that assumption .
